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The modeling tools that have been developed over the last 25 years for the 
identification of routes for hazmat shipments emphasize the tradeoffs between cost 
minimization to the shipper/carrier and controlling the “natural” consequences that 
would stem from an accident. As the terrorist threat has grown, it has become clear 
that a new perspective, which allows for the representation of the goals and activities 
of terrorists, must be incorporated into these routing models. Government agencies can 
determine which specific facilities to restrict for each class of material and for which 
times of the day and/or week. This paper develops a mathematical model of a three-
player game to represent the interactions among government agencies a shipper and 
terrorists as a framework for the analysis. It also develops an effective solution 
procedure for this game and illustrates the use of that procedure on a realistic case 
study.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Approximately 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials (hazmat) move daily 
through the U.S. transportation system (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1998) and 
approximately one truck in five on the U.S. highways is carrying some form of 
hazardous material (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994). In general, the safety 
record is excellent, but public sensitivity to the risks associated with hazmat shipments 
is substantial. The public sector plays a direct role in managing the level of risk 
through the regulation of the transportation network. Government agencies can 
determine which specific facilities to restrict (or allow) for each class (or classes) of 
material and for which times of the day and/or week. Further these regulations may 
take the form of designations (for e.g.: “preferred highway routes” for radioactive 
materials – U.S. Department of Transportation, 1992) or prohibitions (for e.g.: the 
State of New York prohibits movements of explosives across the Verrazano Narrows 
Bridge – U.S. Department of Transportation, 2004).  
 
The development of a model to provide guidance to federal, state and local 
governments regarding which highway facilities might be restricted (for which 
materials and under which conditions) is a challenging but important activity. This is 
particularly important in the context of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
Advisory System (color-coded “threat levels”). If threat level “Orange” or “Red” is 
declared, DHS suggests that government agencies consider constraining the 
transportation system “as appropriate”, but there is little specific guidance on how to 
determine what actions might be “appropriate” (U.S. Department of Homeland 
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Security, 2004). The goal of the model developed in this research is to lead to a better 
understanding of how to make such determinations. 
 
This research develops a game–theoretic model of the interactions among a 
government agency, a shipper/carrier and a terrorist as a framework for the analysis. 
Each of the relevant actors makes choices over time and has only partial control over 
the outcome realized as a result of their choices. For example, the government agency 
can make decisions to restrict the use of some parts of the transportation network, but 
the results of those choices are dependent on the actions of the shipper/carrier and the 
terrorist and conversely these decisions also cause consequences for the shipper/carrier 
and the terrorist. The shipper/carrier selects routes given the rules established by 
government agency. Beyond honoring government restrictions, the shipper/carrier is 
concerned about what the terrorist might do and this concern affects the choice of 
which routes to use. However since the probability of an attack against any single 
shipment is likely to be very small, the goals of the shipper/carrier are still to move the 
materials between locations economically while controlling the level of risk, but now 
the risks include both “natural” risks, including the probability of an accident and the 
effects should an accident occur and “induced” risks generated by potential terrorist 
activities. As for the terrorist, we can assume that their interest is in maximizing the 
damage they can inflict by targeting specific facilities. The choice of the facility is 
influenced by the routes chosen by the shipper/carrier and the regulations adopted by 
the government.  
 
Figure 1 portrays the overall interactions among the actors in this game–theoretic 
framework. The inner box describes the relationship between the terrorist and the 
shipper/carrier. For this relationship, it is assumed that the regulations which indicate 
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when (and for which materials) the shipper/carrier is allowed to use each facility are 
already specified. The analysis that links these two boxes together is normative. That 
is, given: (1) the shipper’s/carrier’s perception about the likelihood of an attack; (2) 
the choices available to the shipper/carrier and the terrorist; (3) the payoff to each, 
given their decisions and those made by their opponent and (4) the terrorist’s 
perception about what material is in a given shipment, the analysis in this work 
identifies first, which routes should the shipper/carrier use (and with what frequency) 
and second, where should the terrorist attack (and with what frequency). The 
interactions between the shipper/carrier and the terrorist is modeled as a non-
cooperative two-person non-zero sum game with the shipper/carrier wishing to 
maximize the value of the routes used when there is a known probability of an attack 
and the terrorist wanting to inflict as much damage as possible in an attack. 
Figure 1. Game-theoretic Problem Structure 
 
The outer box represents the influence of the government on those decisions. The 
government has the opportunity to control the severity of an attack (should one occur) 
 
Government:  
Where, when and for which materials should restrictions on facilities be implemented, 
given beliefs about the likelihood of an attack? 
 
Terrorist:  
Where should an attack be 
attempted, given the beliefs about 
what is in the trucks and where 
they are likely to be? 
 
Shipper/Carrier:  
Which routes should be used, 
given the material transported and 
beliefs about the likelihood of an 
attack? 
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through the use of facility prohibitions. These prohibitions can be sufficiently detailed 
so as to prohibit specific types of hazmat from certain facilities during specific time 
periods and to have those prohibitions change based on the perceived likelihood of an 
attack. These prohibitions bound the consequences of an attack and constrain the 
choices that the shipper/carrier can make. These recommendations are based on the 
identification of Nash equilibrium strategies in the inner game between the terrorist 
and the shipper/carrier, given the prohibitions. 
 
This paper makes three key contributions. First, a game is developed among the 
government, shipper/carrier and a terrorist using a commodity based origin-destination 
table. Second, we show how that game can be used to (1) determine the regulations 
that the government should consider adopting; (2) how those regulations should 
change as the probability of an attack increases; (3) the routes the shipper/carrier 
should consider along with the probability of use and (4) the facilities the terrorist 
should target along with the probabilities. Finally these ideas are applied to a realistic 
case study. 
 
The next section of this work describes the key literature on which this paper is 
developed.  The third section describes the formulation.  The forth sections shows how 
to select route schemes and provides a solution procedure. The fifth section applies the 
formulation to realistic case study – transport of a hazardous substance on the United 
States rail network. A tradeoff curve is developed in this section which enables 
government agencies to assess how link closures affect the risk associated with a 
terrorist attack and shipper’s/carrier’s payoff.  The last section provides key 
conclusions and opportunities for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This paper draws on literature in three key areas. The first key area is routing of 
hazardous materials. While there is extensive literature in this area, we focus on 
common routing attributes and path finding in stochastic dynamic networks for 
brevity. The second area is transportation and terrorism. The third area is the game 
theory literature of direct relevance to this research, including the use of game theory 
to model terrorist activities and the application of game theory models to the modeling 
of transportation problems. The remainder of this section describes key research in 
each area. 
 
Shipper of hazardous materials is commonly concerned with minimizing the economic 
cost and the risk consequences of a release stemming from an accident when selecting 
a route or routes. Much of the economic cost to the carrier is proportional to the time 
taken for the shipment to travel from the origin to the destination. Thus cost 
minimization can be obtained through minimizing the total travel time. Defining 
public risk is more complex, but two characteristics – population exposure and 
accident rate – have gained wide acceptance. The population exposure, depending on 
the characteristics of the hazardous material to be transported, could be defined as the 
people in other vehicles that are within some distance of the shipment as it moves 
from its origin to its destination or it could be expanded to include the population 
residing within some distance of the shipment during its journey. The accident 
probability for a route is the probability of an accident happening along the route. 
Population exposure and accident rate can be combined into a single consequence 
measure for a route by summing across all links in the route the product of accident 
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rate and exposure. Erkut and Verter (1998), Erkut and Ingolfsson (2000) and Chang et 
al. (2005), among others, use the same measure in their hazmat routing studies. 
 
Neither the travel time nor the consequence measure is deterministic since they both 
depend on the traffic volumes and activity patterns. Further they vary with the time of 
the day since characteristics like visibility, traffic volumes and activity patterns vary 
throughout the day. Using the expected values of the attributes ignores the variation 
resulting from these two causes and could lead to selection of routes that have 
acceptable expected values but perform ‘‘poorly” based on when they are actually 
used (Nozick et al., 1997). Hence, we represent the uncertainty for each attribute by a 
probability distribution which varies by the time-of-day.  
 
Dadkar et al. (2008) and Nielsen et al. (2005) developed K shortest path algorithms for 
stochastic and dynamic networks. Dadkar et al. (2008) focused on problem instances 
where the distribution of each link attribute is continuous whereas Nielsen et al. 
(2005) focused on problem instances where the distribution of the link attributes is 
discrete with integer values. In the routing of hazardous materials, the objectives of 
interest produce continuous distributions for link performance. Hence Dadkar et al. 
(2008) is more relevant to this application. Also, Nielsen et al. (2005) focused on 
identifying the exact solution to the K shortest paths problem which leads to 
computational challenges in large networks whereas Dadkar et al. (2008) developed an 
algorithm that is computationally feasible for large networks. Hence for the purposes 
of this analysis we use the algorithm in Dadkar et al. (2008). 
 
There is substantial interest in research related to transportation and terrorism. To date 
much of that research has focused on identifying what parts of the transportation 
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system are vulnerable to terrorism and initial ideas of what should be done about those 
vulnerabilities. For example, see Szyliowicz and Viotti (1997), Chatterjee et al. 
(2001), Frederickson and LaPorte (2002), and Haimes and Longstaff (2002). 
 
Many game theory models have been developed to address a wide variety of 
problems. For a discussion of other game theory models see Fundenberg and Tirole 
(1995) or Kreps (1992). The seminal paper by Nash (1951) established the existence 
of equilibria for finite non-cooperative games but did not develop an algorithm for 
finding them. Among others, Mangasarian and Stone (1964) designed an algorithm for 
computing all the equilibria for finite, two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum 
games (also known as bimatrix games). They modeled a bimatrix game as a single 
integrated mathematical programming formulation and proved that each solution to 
this formulation is a Nash equilibrium point of that game. 
 
There have been several studies that have used game theory to model terrorism. 
Sandler and Arce (2003) and Sandler and Enders (2003) provide excellent literature 
reviews. These studies focus on a variety of issues including the effectiveness of the 
no-negotiation strategy (Lapan and Sandler, 1988 and Selten, 1988), the 
accommodations which can be reached between a terrorist and a host government 
(Lee, 1988) and the strategic interdependence between nations as they attempt to 
combat terrorism (Sandler, 2003). 
 
Most of the more involved games described by Hollander and Prashker (2006) follow 
the Stackelberg leadership model (von Stackelberg, 1934). Stackelberg games are 
played between two players – one of whom is a leader and the other is a follower. The 
leader makes a decision and the follower sees the outcome of the leader’s move and 
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makes her move. Transportation situations adapt well to Stackelberg games since the 
government/transportation authorities can be considered the leader because they 
provide the infrastructure and dictate the rules under which it may be used. Travelers 
then make use of this infrastructure given the rules in place for its use. Stackelberg 
games are often expressed as bilevel optimizations for formulation and solution. 
 
Bell (2000), Bell and Cassir (2002), and Bell (2004) used a two-person zero-sum non-
cooperative game to measure the performance reliability of transport networks in case 
of single user, multiple users and freight vehicle routing problems, respectively. Bell 
(2003) sought to identify the most crucial links or nodes with an aim to defining the 
network’s vulnerability.  In each game, the user(s) seeks a least-cost path with a 
virtual network tester or an ‘‘evil demon” trying to maximize trip cost. To calculate 
the equilibria of these games, they are solved as maximin problems with the Method 
of Successive Averages (MSA). 
 
Biaonco et al. (2009) presented a bilevel formulation focused on risk equity. Both 
levels corresponded to government agencies – the meta-local authority that aims to 
minimize the maximum link risk in the whole network and the regional area authority 
that aims to minimize the total risk over their network. While the focus on equity is 
significantly different than our focus, the core concepts explored in the modeling are 
related. 
 
Kara and Verter (2004) proposed a bilevel formulation where the government imposes 
restrictions on the network and the shipper/carrier then choose the routes. Erkut and 
Gzara (2008) extended this research. They proposed incorporating the transport costs 
in the government objective along with risk considerations, so that the government can 
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represent a trade off between cost and risk. A key difference in the core problem 
examined in these papers and the one considered in the presented research is the 
character of the policy adopted by the government and the shipper/carrier. In case of 
Kara and Verter (2004) and Erkut and Gzara (2008), the policies adopted by both the 
government and the shipper/carrier should be static.  The only uncertainty represented 
in these papers is that associated with natural risks (which are independent of the 
actions of either player). Our analysis focuses on situations for which there is a third 
player in the form of a malicious terrorist attacker and therefore an analysis that 
admits randomized policies is likely to be more beneficial to the shipper/carrier. This, 
in turn, will force a randomized policy to be more advantageous to the terrorist. Since 
the policy must be implementable it is likely important that the prohibitions enacted by 
the government be static (or vary only with threat level).  
 
Szeto and Sumalee (2008) propose similar goals to the ones of this paper – use a game 
theoretic model to identify routing and scheduling decisions for multiple hazmat 
shippers/carriers interested in moving material between specific locations.  However, 
the proposed formulation is a zero-sum game which is not computational feasible for 
large networks.  Additionally, the role of a government entity, controlling terrorist 
gains, is absent. 
 
Dadkar et al. (2009) develop a non-zero sum game-theoretic model of the interactions 
among government agencies, a single repetitive hazmat shipment for a single origin to 
a single destination, and terrorists.  A heuristic is used to find optimal sets of 
government imposed facility restrictions that produce a Nash equilibria where the 
shipper’s/carrier’s expected payoff is as high as possible given that the terrorist’s 
expected payoff is below a prescribed threshold.  This work assumes only one hazmat 
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shipment made repetitively from a single origin to a single destination.  However, it 
does provide an excellent point of departure for this analysis. This analysis focuses on 
how to identify these facility restrictions when there is a full origin-destination table 
for the commodity of interest. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MODEL FORMULATION 
 
The objectives of this model are twofold. The first is to identify the strategies of the 
shipper/carrier and the terrorist given government imposed prohibitions. We assume 
that the shipper/carrier and the terrorist would pursue Nash equilibrium strategies for 
the non-cooperative two-person non-zero sum game. The second is for the government 
to identify link prohibitions that maximize the shipper’s/carrier’s payoff while limiting 
the terrorist’s payoff. We formulate this optimization problem as a Stackelberg game 
in which the government is the leader and the shipper/carrier and the terrorist are the 
followers. 
 
We consider a shipper/carrier who repetitively wants to deliver an extremely 
hazardous substance between multiple origin–destination pairs. There are multiple 
routes that connect each origin–destination pair. We define a routing scheme to be a 
unique strategy which identifies the route to deliver the substance for each origin–
destination pair. Let us assume that there are m  routing schemes. A terrorist can 
choose from n  links to attack. These n  links are all the links that appear on at least 
one route that the shipper/carrier considers. A procedure for developing the routing 
schemes is given in the next subsection.   
 
We assume that the government, the shipper/carrier and the terrorist have common 
knowledge on the network structure, the payoffs for both the shipper/carrier and the 
terrorist. We assume that in case of an attack, only one link is targeted each time an 
attack is mounted and every attack is successful. We also assume that the probability 
of an attack  p  is known. The probability p  can be interpreted as indirectly 
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reflecting a rate at which attacks are mounted or as a subjective estimate of likelihood 
at a given time. The estimation of p  is likely to be based on intelligence information. 
Therefore, it will be important to perform an analysis to understand the sensitivity of 
the recommendations to changes in the estimate for p . This type of analysis is 
illustrated in Section 5. 
 
Let A  and B  be the m n  payoff matrices for the shipper/carrier and the terrorist, 
respectively. The payoffs to both the players depend on whether the route chosen by 
the shipper/carrier traverses the link targeted by the terrorist. The payoff matrix for the 
shipper/carrier, A , can be formulated using probability of attack  p , the utility of 
each route to the shipper/carrier as well as the consequences of a successful attack to 
the shipper/carrier. The utility of a routing scheme is simply the sum of the utilities of 
the routes selected for each shipment. The matrix entry  ,A i j  is the payoff to the 
shipper/carrier when he uses routing scheme i  and link j  is targeted to attack. If link 
j  is not on routing scheme i ,  ,A i j  is assumed to be the utility of that routing 
scheme. However, if route i  traverses link j ,  ,A i j  is assumed to be the expected 
value of the utility of routing scheme i  in case of no attack and the representative 
value of damage caused by a successful attack (in this case, the population exposure 
on the link j  when the route i  traverses it). 
 
The payoff matrix for the terrorist, B , can be formulated using probability of attack 
 p  and the utility of a successful attack to the terrorist. The matrix entry  ,B i j  is 
the payoff to the terrorist when he targets link j  and routing scheme i  is used. 
 ,B i j  is assumed to be p  times the population exposure on link j  if the 
shipper/carrier uses routing scheme i  that contains that link and 0 otherwise. 
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The government can influence the decisions of the shipper/carrier by prohibiting the 
use of certain facilities during certain time periods. Thus, the shipper/carrier may not 
use routes which would violate those prohibitions. Also, terrorists will know of these 
prohibitions and therefore they will not stage attacks on facilities when these 
prohibitions are in effect. The objective of the government is to establish rules for the 
use of certain facilities that maximize the shipper’s/carrier’s payoff while limiting the 
terrorist’s payoff. In the next subsection we present the mathematical programs for the 
bi-level optimization problem. 
 
3.1 Shipper/Carrier and Terrorist Optimization Problem 
 We assume that both the shipper/carrier and the terrorist would pursue Nash 
equilibrium strategies for the game after observing the government’s regulation. We 
first model the government’s decision. Let  jz z  be a 1n  binary decision vector 
to indicate the prohibitions enacted by the government. If 0jz  , then link j  is 
prohibited from use and 1jz   otherwise.  
 
We then formulate the shipper’s/carrier’s and the terrorist’s optimization problem. Let 
ijc  be 1 if link j  is included in the routing scheme i  used by the shipper/carrier and 0 
otherwise and let  ijC c . We next define the decision variables for the 
shipper/carrier and the terrorist. Let x  be a 1m  decision vector to indicate the 
frequency with which the shipper/carrier uses each of the m  routing schemes. Let y  
be a 1n  decision vector to indicate the frequency with which each of the n  links are 
targeted by the terrorist. The shipper/carrier’s optimization problem is to choose the 
shipping frequency vector x  that maximizes his expected payoff 
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'x Ay                                                                 (1) 
subject to ' 1e x  ,            (2) 
'C x z ,                                                             (3) 
   0x  ,        (4) 
 
and the terrorist’s optimization problem is to choose the attack frequency vector y  
that maximizes his expected payoff 
 
'x By                                                                (5) 
subject to ' 1l y  ,           (6) 
y z ,                                                              (7)                           
   0y  ,                                                              (8) 
 
where e and l  are 1m  and 1n  vectors of 1s, respectively.  
 
Recall that a Nash equilibrium point is defined by the pair of strategies  0 0,x y  that 
solves both the mathematical programs simultaneously (Nash, 1951). Note that the 
game defined by these two mathematical programs may not have a pair of Nash 
equilibrium strategies for some government decision z . For example, 0z   , the 
feasible decision set of the game is empty. To simplify our notation, we assume that 
both the carrier/shipper’s and terrorist’s objective values are negative infinity if the 
game is infeasible. Thus, we can focus on the case in which there exists a Nash 
equilibrium solution. 
 
Since a Nash equilibrium solution is defined by two separate mathematical programs, 
it is useful to convert the two mathematical programs into a single mathematical 
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program. To this end, we need to define additional variables. Let   and   be scalar 
variables and let    and   be the 1n  vector variables. Consider the following 
quadratic program that chooses  , , , , ,x y      to maximize the quadratic function 
 
 '( ) ' 'x A B y z                                              (9) 
subject to Ay e C   ,                                                 (10) 
'B x l   ,          (11) 
      ' 1e x  ,                                                        (12) 
' 1l y  ,                                                        (13) 
'z C x ,                                                       (14) 
z y ,                                                         (15) 
 0x  ,                                                         (16) 
0y  ,                                                         (17) 
0  ,                                                         (18) 
0  .                                                         (19) 
 
The following proposition shows that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the two-
person game can be characterized by the solutions of the quadratic program.  
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that the game defined by mathematical programs (1) – (8) is 
feasible. Then a pair of strategies  0 0,x y  is a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies for 
the game defined by mathematical programs (1) – (8) if and only if there exist 
 0 0 0 0, , ,     such that  0 0 0 0 0 0, , , , ,x y      solves the quadratic program (9) – 
(19) and the maximum objective value is 0. 
Proof. We first claim that  0 0,x y  solve mathematical program (1) – (4) and 
mathematical program (5) – (8) simultaneously if and only if there exist two scalars 
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0  and 0  and two 1n vectors 0  and 0  such that  0 0 0 0 0 0, , , , ,x y      satisfies 
constraints (10) – (19) and  
   0 0 0' ' 0x C z   ,                                              (20) 
   0 0 0 0' ' 0x Ay z    ,                                           (21) 
   0 0 0' ' 0y z   ,                                                (22) 
   0 0 0 0 0' ' 0x By y    .                                          (23) 
 
To see this, note that for the given 0y y , mathematical program (1) – (4) is a linear 
program. Since this linear program is feasible by assumption and the feasible set is 
bounded, then the corresponding dual program has a finite optimal solution. Let 
 0 0,   be a finite optimal dual solution for the linear program, where 0  is the dual 
value that corresponds to constraint (2) and 0  is the 1n  vector of the dual values 
that correspond to constraint (3). Then 0x  is an optimal solution for linear program (1) 
– (4) for the given 0y y  and  0 0,   is an optimal dual solution if an only if  
 
  0 0' ' 0x C z   , 
   0 0 0 0' 0x Ay e C    , 
 
and constraints (10), (12), (14), (16) and (18) hold. This is because constraints (10), 
(12), (14), (16) and (18) are the feasibility constraints for both the primal and the dual 
programs and the other two equations follow from the complementary slackness 
theorem for linear programming. These two equations and constraint (12) ensure that 
constraints (20) and (21) hold. 
 
Consider the linear program (5) – (8) for the given 0x x  and its corresponding dual 
program. Let  0 0,   be a finite optimal dual solution. It follows from the previous 
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argument that 0y  is an optimal solution for linear program (5) – (8) for the given 0x  
and  0 0,   is a finite optimal dual solution if an only if  
 
  0 0' ' 0y z   , 
   0 0 0 0' ' 0y B x l    , 
 
and constraints (11), (13), (15), (17) and (19) hold. These two equations and constraint 
(13) ensure that constraints (22) and (23) hold. This proves the claim. 
 
Now we can use the claim to prove the proposition. Suppose that  0 0,x y  is a pair of 
Nash equilibrium strategies. Then it follows from the claim that there exist two scalars 
0  and 0  and two 1n  vectors 0  and 0  such that  0 0 0 0 0 0, , , , ,x y      is a 
feasible solution of the quadratic program (9) – (19). Also note that 
 
      0 0 0 0 0 0'( ) ' 'x A B y z         
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0' ' ' ' 0x Ay z x By z          , 
 
where the second equation follows from constraints (21) and (23). Also note that for 
each feasible solution  , , , , ,x y      for the quadratic program (9) – (19), 
 
' ' ' 'x Ay x e x C z        and ' ' ' 'x By l y y z       . 
 
Then 
 '( ) ' ' 0x A B y z         . 
 
This implies that  0 0 0 0 0 0, , , , ,x y      solves the quadratic program. 
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Conversely, if  0 0 0 0 0 0, , , , ,x y      solves the quadratic program, then the previous 
argument implies that 
 
      0 0 0 0 0 0'( ) ' ' 0x A B y z         . 
 
We assume that there exists a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies. It follows from the 
claim that there exist a feasible solution of the quadratic program (9) – (19) 
 , , , , ,x y      such that 
 
 '( ) ' ' 0x A B y z         . 
Then  
      0 0 0 0 0 0'( ) ' ' 0x A B y z         . 
 
Constraints (10) – (19) and the above equation imply that 
 
     0 0 0 0' ' ' 'x Ay x e x C z       , 
 0 0 0 0' ' ' 'x By l y y z       . 
 
This implies that constraints (20) – (23) hold and this proves the proposition. Q.E.D. 
 
It is useful to know that if 1jz   for all j ,  the quadratic program would reduce to the 
quadratic program by Magnasain and Stone (1964). To see this, recall that Magnasain 
and Stone (1964) show that there exist  , , ,x y    such that constrains (12), (13), 
(15), and (16) hold and also Ay e , 'B x l , and '( ) 0x A B y      . Let 
10m 

 and 10n 

. Note that  , , , , ,x y      is an optimal solution. Therefore, the 
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quadratic program (9) – (19) is an extension of the quadratic program established by 
Magnasain and Stone (1964). 
 
Note that the quadratic program (9) – (19) may not have a unique solution. Then we 
need secondary criteria to choose a Nash equilibrium strategy. It is reasonable to 
assume that the shipper/carrier would play the Nash equilibrium strategy that 
maximizes his payoff. Also note that a Nash equilibrium solution depends on the 
government’s decision z . Let  z  be the set of  , , ,     such that there exist  
 ,x y  for which  , , , , ,x y      is a solution to the quadratic program for the given 
z . Based on the previous proof, we conclude that the payoffs to the shipper/carrier 
and the terrorist at the solutions are respectively ' z   and ' z   for all 
   , , , z     . Let      'z z z   be the maximum payoff to the 
shipper/carrier over  z  for the given z  and      'z z z   be the corresponding 
payoff to the terrorist. 
 
3.2 Government Optimization Problem 
Recall that the objective of the government is to maximize the shipper/carrier’s payoff 
while limiting the terrorist’s payoff. To model this problem, let   be the government’s 
tolerance of the terrorist’s payoff. Then the government chooses the prohibition vector 
z  that maximizes 
 
     'z z z                                                     (24) 
such that       'z z z    ,                                          (25) 
 0,1jz   for 1, ,j n  .                                            (26) 
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The objective function (24) is to maximize the expected payoff of the shipper/carrier. 
Constraint (25) limits the payoff of the terrorist and constraints (26) impose binary 
constraints on the decision variables. 
 
Observe that the maximization problem (24) – (26) may not feasible. We assume that 
the objective value of the maximization program is negative infinity in this case. 
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CHAPTER4 
SOLUTION PROCEDURE 
 
Since transportation networks are typically large, there can be (1) many possible 
routes for each shipment, leading to an exorbitant number of routing schemes, and (2) 
there are many distinct sets of link prohibitions which need to be considered. 
Therefore, quadratic maximization problem (9) – (19) for each set of link prohibitions 
will be large making the identification of its solution challenging. Also, as the number 
of sets of link prohibitions increases, the number of the non-concave quadratic 
maximization problems which must be solved increases. Thus, it becomes important to 
control the number of routing schemes and the number of link prohibitions examined. 
To this end, we first show how to identify “good” route choices for each shipment and 
how to assemble them into a routing scheme. We then describe a heuristic which 
identifies reasonable sets of links to prohibit in order to identify the trade-off frontier 
for p . 
 
4.1. Formulation of Routing Schemes 
Recall that a routing scheme identifies for each origin-destination pair the route to use. 
Note that the optimal strategies for the shipper/carrier and the terrorist are pareto-
efficient and therefore, only those routing schemes need to be explicitly identified. 
This greatly reduces the number of routing schemes which must be generated. Recall 
that a routing scheme is non-dominated for the shipper/carrier if there are no other 
routing schemes that have an equal or better expected payoff for each link that might 
be attacked with at least one link being strictly better.   
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We estimate the non-dominated routing schemes using the following four steps.  In the 
first three steps routing schemes, based on the shipper/carrier’ strategies, which are 
likely to be pareto-efficient are identified.  In the fourth step, based on dominance 
applied to the shipper and terrorist’s strategies, the non-dominated set of routing 
schemes from those routing schemes identified in Steps 1 through 3 is identified.   
 
The first step is based on the observation that the routing scheme that gives the best 
expected payoff for the shipper/carrier when a specific link is attacked often creates 
useful strategies for consideration. Hence, Step 1 identifies routing schemes by 
choosing the route for each shipment which maximizes the expected payoff for the 
shipper/carrier for each link attacked.  Based on these routing schemes, we can then 
estimate a set of the non-dominated links. 
 
Step 2 identifies routing schemes focused on the estimated set of non-dominated 
strategies for the terrorist. This is done as follows. For each shipment, identify the 
route that maximizes the minimum return they would receive if the terrorist attacks 
one of the estimated non-dominated links. That decision is then augmented with an 
assumption that the remaining shipments use the route with the highest utility yielding 
a complete routing scheme. Note that this process will generate at most, the same 
number of routing schemes as there are unique origin-destination pairs. If the routing 
schemes identified leads to additional strategies for the terrorist that are non-
dominated this step must be repeated with the set of non-dominated strategies for the 
terrorist expanded. 
 
In Step 3 we explore changes to the routing schemes identified in the first two steps 
with the goal of identifying strategies that are better. This is done as follows.  For each 
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routing scheme and origin-destination pair, see if by using a different route for that 
origin-destination pair, an improvement can be identified, where an improvement is 
defined as an increase in the expected payoff to the shipper/carrier for an estimated 
non-dominated strategy for the terrorist.  The key element of this step is that for each 
routing scheme and origin-destination pair we consider each link in the estimated non-
dominated set to search for improvements in the routing scheme.  Note that this is an 
iterative process. Each time a new routing scheme is identified, this type of change is 
explored.  If the routing schemes identified leads to additional strategies for the 
terrorist that are non-dominated, Step 2 and Step 3 must be repeated with the add-
itional set of non-dominated strategies for the terrorist expanded.  
 
In Step 4 we apply the dominance criteria iteratively to the shipper’s/carrier’s and the 
terrorist’s payoff matrices until no strategies can be removed. 
 
4.2. Solution Strategies 
Based on the expected payoff matrices for both the shipper/carrier and the terrorist 
generated in the previous section, the following heuristic can be used to estimate the 
trade-off frontier between the expected payoffs for the shipper/carrier and the terrorist.  
1. Let Γ be the set of non-dominated links identified in Step 4 (in the algorithm 
used to generate routing schemes assuming no link restrictions). 
2. Enumerate all combinations links in Γ to obtain 2Γ possible subsets of Γ. 
Initialize our estimate of the efficient frontier for the payoff to the shipper and 
the terrorist to null. 
3. For each subset of Γ, determined the shipper’s/carrier’s set of non-dominated 
routing schemes and solve the quadratic program (9) – (19). For each nonlinear 
optimization record the payoff to the shipper and the terrorist and the links 
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restricted. Update our estimate of the efficient frontier between the payoffs to 
the shipper and the terrorist. Note whether new point(s) have been added to the 
frontier. If no new points have been added, stop. 
4. If the terrorist attacks any links not in the set Γ, add that link to Γ and go to 
Step 2.  
  
It is important to remember that we generate the routing schemes assuming which 
links are available for use. As that set is restricted, some links which were previously 
dominated are no longer dominated (because some of those that dominated have been 
prohibited from use). Also, at a minimum, this algorithm will iterate through Step 2 
twice because restricting all links identified in Step 1 will force the identification of 
more strategies for the terrorist. In the case study, the inclusion of these new strategies 
did not generate more points for our estimate of the efficient frontier. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY 
 
To illustrate the use of the formulation and solution procedure on a realistic problem, 
we consider the transportation of a single hazardous material over the US rail network 
between 55 unique origin-destination pairs. The origins and destinations for those 
hazardous material shipments are represented by a set of 84 Transportation Analysis 
Zones (TAZs), which are aggregations of BEA areas. The TAZs and US rail network 
are shown in Figure 2. For simplicity, we assume that all shipments depart from their 
origins at 12 AM. In practice, pure strategies for multiple departure times can easily be 
integrated into the payoff matrices. The key question investigated in this case study is 
the estimation of the tradeoff frontier between controlling the consequences of an 
attack and the economic effects on the Shipper/Carrier for specific values of the 
probability of an attack, p.  
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Figure 2. The case study network with TAZs shown 
 
First, we need to identify the pure strategies available to the Shipper/Carrier, the 
Terrorist, and the Government, as well as the payoff matrices for both the 
Shipper/Carrier and the Terrorist that reflect their key motivations and assumed 
behaviors. The Shipper/Carrier chooses one route for each shipment (repetitive 
movements from the same origin to the same destination) to create a routing scheme 
and these routing schemes are thus the pure strategies available to the Shipper/Carrier. 
We use the K shortest path algorithm developed for stochastic dynamic networks by 
Dadkar et al. (2008a) to generate 200 paths for each specific shipment. This is done 
for all 55 shipments. Therefore, we assume that all paths of any interest to the 
Shipper/Carrier will be included in the “best” 200. We make the following 
assumptions for the purpose of this analysis. 
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For the purposes of this analysis the following is assumed: 
1. Link travel time is modeled as a sum of free–flow time plus an exponentially 
distributed random delay with a mean of 10% of the free flow travel time. Even 
though the random delay on a link is modeled as a constant plus an exponential 
random delay we assume that the travel time across a path is approximately normal 
based on the Central Limit Theorem and as also assumed in Chang et al. (2005). 
2. Accident probability varies according to a gamma distribution based on the work 
of Nembhard (1994) where the scale parameter is based on whether the link is 
urban or rural. 
3. The major hazards are fire or vapor exposure, or both, in the event of an accident 
or an attack. The at–risk population is the community located within 2-miles of the 
link (U.S. Census 2000). Our focus is the US rail network, hence the on-link 
population is considered negligible.   
 
For this analysis, it is important that there is one measure which summarizes the value 
of using each route in comparison to others for each shipment; hence we define a 
composite measure for each route as the equally weighted sum of travel time and 
consequence measure (a combination of population exposure and accident probability) 
across all links. An increase in this composite measure signifies that the 
Shipper/Carrier is worse off. Thus the negative value of the mean of this composite 
measure is taken as the utility of a route for a given shipment and the Shipper/Carrier 
will choose the routes with the lowest composite measure mean for higher utility. Note 
that the Shipper/Carrier achieves this utility only in case of no attack. To reflect each 
shipment’s usage of the network, the utility of a route for a particular shipment is then 
scaled proportional to the carloads shipped per year. 
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This case study network has 282 bidirectional links. However, only 259 of which are 
on the 200 shortest paths for the 55 shipments on which we focus. Thus only 259 links 
are of interest to the Government. These are the pure strategies available to the 
Government since the Government will want to restrict the movement of hazmat on 
only these links. The Government has the option of closing none, some, or all links. 
Similarly these 259 links are also the pure strategies available to the Terrorist since the 
Terrorist will want to attack only those links that are utilized by the Shipper/Carrier. 
The expected payoffs matrices are developed as described in Section 3.0. 
 
The algorithm was run with an assumed p = 0.001% and 0.01%.  The MATLAB 
Optimization Toolbox was used to solve the non-linear program and all experiments 
were run on a Xeon X5450 3.0 GHz PC. The remainder of this section is divided into 
three subsections. The first subsection demonstrates the four-step process of 
formulating routing schemes using the case study network. Subsection 2 develops link 
prohibitions based on a simple measure. The performance of these prohibitions serves 
as a point of comparison with method given in Section 4.2 and illustrated in 
Subsections 3 and 4.  Subsections 3 and 4 focus on interpreting the efficient frontiers 
found for the two different assumed probabilities of attack (0.001% and 0.01%) in 
order to understand how the strategies change for the Shipper/Carrier, the Terrorist, 
and the Government. 
 
5.1 Routing Schemes 
When link prohibitions are imposed by the Government, some or all of each 
shipment’s 200 routes may become infeasible. If all become infeasible we generate 
additional routes, if they exist. In this case study, if this occurs; there are no additional 
routes to add to the analysis. For each unique combination of link prohibitions, we 
 29 
identify only feasible pure strategies for the Shipper/Carrier and the Terrorist. For the 
Shipper/Carrier, we enumerate likely routing schemes, and for the Terrorist, we 
identify all the links that are used by at least one of the enumerated routing schemes. 
One route is contributed for each shipment to create a routing scheme and we focus on 
developing routing schemes likely to be pareto-efficient as described in Section 4.1. 
 
We evaluate the value of a routing scheme by the total path utility in the case of an 
attack. The 200 routes enumerated for each of the 55 shipments are assigned a path 
utility which reflects a successful trip, as discussed in Section 5.0. However, with 
some probability, p ≥ 0, the trip is unsuccessful due to an attack on a specific link, and 
the Shipper/Carrier experiences losses to their path utility. We define an individual 
shipment’s path utility be the expected utility received from successfully completing a 
trip on this path minus the expected losses from a successful terrorist attack on a 
specific link. We aggregate these utilities to create the total path utility of the routing 
scheme based on the link attacked. Note that this is the logic behind the entries of the 
Shipper’s/Carrier’s payoff matrix, A, as described in Section 3.0. 
 
The goal of the first step for creating routing schemes is to maximize the 
Shipper’s/Carrier’s total path utility in the case of an attack on a specific link and this 
is done for each link in the network. We sequentially choose one link and assume it is 
this link that the Terrorist targets. Then, for each shipment, we select the route that 
maximizes the path utility in the case of an attack on this link. Loss of utility stems 
from either or both of the following two possibilities: (1) the shipment travels along a 
route different from its highest utility route in the case of no attack, and (2) the 
Terrorist targets a link on the path along which the shipment travels. Therefore, the 
Shipper/Carrier may find benefit using a route lower in utility in the case of no attack 
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for a particular shipment when it is known that the Terrorist will target a link not on 
this route. We then aggregate the chosen routes for each shipment into a routing 
scheme. This routing scheme is always non-dominated since there is no other routing 
scheme that has an equal or better total path utility in the case of an attack on the 
specific link and is a pareto-efficient row in the Shipper’s/Carrier’s payoff matrix, A. 
 
To illustrate this concept, let us assume that Link S in Figure 3 will exclusively be 
targeted by the Terrorist. For the sake of this discussion, we are only interested in 
Shipment σ, which is departing Oakland, CA (for Houston, TX). We show Shipment 
σ’s best and second best utility routes in the case of no attack in Figure 3. Note that 
these primary and secondary routes share the link traveling through Modesto. 
Shipment σ traverses Link S when traveling its primary route, but does not when 
traveling its secondary route. Table 1 shows the utility from using Shipment σ’s 
primary and secondary routes in the case of no attack, the expected losses from an 
attack on Link S, and path utility from an attack on Link S, for p = 0.001%. As Table 
1 shows, even when the attack likelihood is relatively low (p = 0.001%), there is 
benefit from having Shipment σ use its secondary route, since this path’s utility in the 
case of an attack on Link S, -108.40, is greater than the primary route’s utility in the 
case of an attack on Link S, -108.81. This directly implies that the losses in utility 
from using a worse utility route (the second route) in case of no attack are less than the 
losses to utility from a terrorist attack on Link S when the shipment is present. For the 
sake of this argument, no other shipments’ primary routes in the case of no attack 
traverse Link S. Therefore, the Shipper/Carrier would decide that all remaining 
shipments use their best utility route in the case of no attack.   
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Table 1. Shipment σ’s route utility in the case of an attack on Link S and p = 0.001% 
Route 
preference in 
the case of 
no attack  
Route utility 
in the case of 
no attack 
Exposure on 
Link S 
Expected losses 
from terrorism 
on Link S when 
p = 0.001% 
Route utility in 
the case of an 
attack on Link S 
and p = 0.001% 
First -108.14 67,000 0.67 -108.81 
Second -108.40 0 0.00 -108.40 
 
Figure 3.  Shipment σ’s strategies  
 
We identify the current non-dominated links before proceeding to Step 2.  Remember 
that in Step 1 we have identified a routing scheme for each link that might be attacked. 
That gives us 259 routing schemes. However, based the Shipper’s/Carrier’s defined 
strategies at this point, not all of the links will be of interest to the Terrorist. If we look 
at the return to the Terrorist for attacks on each link given the 259 routing schemes, 
some links might lead to returns that are always no better than other link.  These links 
are dominated and can be removed from consideration.   
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In Step 1 of the routing scheme formulation, we used a link-based approach to 
maximize the Shipper’s/Carrier’s total path utility from an attack on a particular link. 
In Step 2, we focus on the individual shipments and choose for each shipment which 
route maximizes the shipment’s path utility in the case of an attack. Since the Terrorist 
is a destruction maximizer, he targets the non-dominated link on a shipment’s path 
that possesses the greatest vulnerability. If the path does not contain a non-dominated 
link, the Terrorist will not consider attacking any links along this path and the path 
utility is simply the utility given from completing the route. Using this logic, we 
develop a routing scheme in which the Shipper/Carrier decides that all shipments 
besides the selected shipment use the path that offers the greatest utility in the case of 
no attack and the chosen shipment uses the path that offers the greatest utility in the 
case of an attack. In Step 2, the number of routing schemes added is equal to the 
number of shipments, though the number of unique routing scheme may be less. 
 
Let’s examine Shipment σ from Step 1. We focus on this shipment’s three best utility 
routes in the case of no attack, all shown in Figure 3. Also, say we know that Links R 
S, and T are non-dominated, in addition to other links on paths not utilized by 
Shipment σ from the dominance criterion applied to the routing schemes developed in 
Step 1.  
 
If Shipment σ were to use its best route in the case of no attack, Link S will be 
attacked since it is the most vulnerable link on this route. Similarly, Link T will be 
attacked when the secondary route is used and Link R is attacked when the tertiary 
route is used.  
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Table 2 shows Shipment σ’s path utilities for two different attack probabilities (p = 
0.001% and 0.01%) for the three routes. From this we see that when the probability of 
attack is low (0.001%), the best strategy is to have Shipment σ use its primary route 
because it is the primary route which offers the best path utility in the case of an attack 
(-108.81). This infers that the loss from an attack on Link S when Shipment σ uses its 
primary route is less than the combined utility loss of using a non-primary route and 
having a link on this non-primary route being attacked. From this, we create a routing 
scheme where every shipment, including Shipment σ, uses their best route in the case 
of no attack. When the probability of an attack is 0.01%, on the other hand, there is an 
advantage to having Shipment σ use its tertiary route since it is this route that has the 
maximum path utility in the case of an attack on Link R (-111.87). The expected 
exposure on the third route’s most vulnerable link - Link R - is less the expected 
exposure on the other two paths’ most vulnerable links, making it advantageous 
despite a lower route utility in the case of no attack. For this p, a routing scheme is 
added that has Shipment σ using its third best route in the case of no attack, and all 
other shipments using their best route in the case of no attack. 
 
Table 2. Shipment σ’s route utilities in the case an attack on its most vulnerable links 
Route 
preference in 
the case of 
no attack  
Route utility 
in the case 
of no attack 
Path’s 
targeted link 
Exposure on 
the Path’s 
targeted link 
Route utility 
in the case 
of an attack 
and p = 
0.001% 
Route utility 
in the case 
of an attack 
and p = 
0.01% 
First -108.14 S 67,000 -108.81 -114.83 
Second -108.40 T 42,100 -108.82 -112.60 
Third -108.49 R 33,900 -108.83 -111.87 
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In Step 2, we select the path for each shipment that minimizes the route utility loss in 
the case of an attack, assuming the Terrorist will target the most vulnerable non-
dominated link on a given path. However, all players may choose to and receive 
benefit from varying their strategy. Therefore, in Step 3, we consider the ability of the 
Terrorist to use mixed strategies and consider what the Shipper/Carrier might do in 
response. 
 
This is done as follows: We consecutively select a previously developed routing 
scheme which gives us a defined strategy for each shipment. Given the 
Shipper’s/Carrier’s strategy for an individual shipment, we successively allow an 
attack to occur on each of the non-dominated links already defined and see if the 
Shipper/Carrier receives an improvement in route utility in the case of an attack on 
one of these non-dominated links from having a shipment use a different path.  If so, a 
new routing scheme is added, which is identical to the routing scheme being 
examined, except for the new route for the given shipment. Notice that this doesn’t 
yield a routing scheme with multiple routes for a single shipment. Rather it adds a new 
routing scheme with the new route assigned to a single shipment. This process is 
iterative, meaning each newly defined routing scheme is examined for attacks on 
multiple non-dominated links using the same logic. Step 3 is complete once every 
routing scheme has been examined for route utility improvements in the case of 
attacks on non-dominated links. The last iteration produces no new routing schemes. 
Occasionally, new non-dominated links are discovered. When this occurs, all routing 
scheme developed before this discovery are reexamined for a path utility improvement 
in the case of an attack on the newly discovered non-dominated link. 
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This is illustrated using the routing scheme developed in Step 1, from which we know 
that given an attack on Link S, Shipment σ uses its second highest utility route in the 
case of no attack and all other shipments use their highest utility routes in the case of 
no attack. Like Step 2, assume that Links R, S, and T, in addition to other links not in 
this region and of current interest, are non-dominated. We now introduce Shipment τ, 
which is also departing from Oakland (for Los Angeles, CA). Shipment τ’s highest, 
second highest, and third highest utility routes in the case of no attack are shown in 
Figure 4. Note that Shipment τ’s secondary and tertiary routes overlap on the link 
traveling through Modesto. 
 
We know from Step 1, when an attack occurs only on Link S, Shipment τ uses its 
primary route, since this path does not traverse Link S and therefore does not pose a 
threat to this shipment. We are now concerned with Shipper’s/Carrier’s best response 
for Shipment τ in the case of an attack on Link R or S. Table 3 shows Shipment τ’s 
path utility in the case of no attack for its three top routes, the expected losses from an 
attack on Links R and S, and the path utility in the case of an attack on Links R or S. 
The last column shows the worst possible expected path utility from a combination of 
attacks on Links R and S. For example, should the Shipper/Carrier decide that 
Shipment τ should use its primary route, the worst expected path utility results from an 
attack on Link R exclusively. Similarly, the worst expected path utility from Shipment 
τ using its secondary route comes from an exclusive attack on Link S. Should 
Shipment τ use its tertiary route, the expected path utility in the case of any 
combination of a frequency of attacks on Links R and S is the same as the case of no 
attack. Given the worst case scenario for attacks on Links R or S, the Shipper/Carrier 
is best served by having Shipment τ use its tertiary route since it has the highest worst 
case expected path utility in the case of an attack on Links R or S. From this, we create 
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a routing scheme where Shipment σ uses its secondary route, Shipment τ uses its 
tertiary route, and all other shipments on the network use their primary route in the 
case of no attack. 
 
Table 3. Shipment τ’s path utility in the case of an attack on Links R or S and p = 
0.01% 
Route 
preference 
in the case 
of no 
attack  
Route 
utility 
in the 
case of 
no 
attack 
Expected 
losses 
from an 
attack on 
Link R 
Expected 
losses 
from an 
attack on 
Link S 
Expected 
path 
utility 
from an 
attack on 
Link R  
Expected 
path 
utility 
from an 
attack on 
Link S 
Worst 
Case 
Scenario 
Min-
imum 
First -108.40 0.34 0 -111.78 -108.40 Link R is 
attacked 
-111.78 
Second -108.52 0 0.67 -108.52 -115.20 Link S is 
attacked 
-115.20 
Third -108.53 0 0 -108.53 -108.53 None -108.53 
 
Figure 4. Shipment τ’s strategies 
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In Step 4 we apply the dominance criteria iteratively to the Shipper’s/Carrier’s and 
Terrorist’s payoff matrices, A and B, until no strategies can be removed. 
 
Steps 1 through 4 provide a heuristic for generating routing schemes that are likely to 
be non-dominated strategies for both the Shipper/Carrier and the Terrorist. They are 
critical component for completing the solution procedure described in 4.2, where we 
evaluate the expected payoffs to the Shipper/Carrier and the terrorist for all 
combinations of non-dominated link closures and from this identify the efficient 
frontier.  
 
Before identifying the set of non-dominated links and estimating the trade-off frontier 
(between the return to the Shipper/Carrier and the Terrorist) for a given value of p, via 
the process described in section 4.2, it is useful to examine the impact of adopting a 
“simple” rule to identify the prohibitions.  This provides a mechanism to compare the 
restrictions developed via the process in Section 4.2.  A reasonable simple rule might 
be to enact prohibitions on links with high exposure. The following subsection focuses 
on the performance of this type of rule. Subsections 5.3 and 5.4 apply the method 
described in Section 4.2 to estimate the efficient frontiers when p = 0.001% and p = 
0.01%, respectively. 
 
5.2 Closing the N most populated links, probability of an attack = 0.001% 
Before identifying the set of non-dominated links and estimating the trade-off frontier 
(between the return to the Shipper/Carrier and the Terrorist) for a given value of p, via 
the process described in Section 4.2, it is useful to examine the impact of adopting a 
“simple” rule to identify the prohibitions.  This provides a mechanism to compare the 
restrictions developed via the process in Section 4.2.  A reasonable simple rule might 
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be to enact prohibitions on links with high exposure. The following subsection focuses 
on the performance of this type of rule.  
 
Figure 5 shows the expected payoffs to the Terrorist and the Shipper/Carrier when the 
links are ranked in order of their exposure levels and then successively closed (with all 
links having higher exposure levels being closed as well) when p = 0.001%. As the 
figure shows, closing the five most populated links on the networks is no better (and 
albeit no worse) than closing no links. When the top six through the top 21 most 
populated links are restricted, the expected payoff to the Terrorist increases by 
approximately 50% to 0.30 - despite the best of intentions of the Government.  
 
When the 22 most populated links are restricted, the expected payoff to the Terrorists 
drops to 0.2 - approximately the same exposure level as when no links are restricted. 
Here, the expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier decreases (from about -108 to -120) 
since about 2% (840 out of 44,720) of total carloads is unable to be transported.  
 
Closing the top 25 most populated links reduces the expected payoff to the Terrorist to 
0.10. The Terrorist receives the same expected payoff whether the top 25 most 
populated links are restricted or the top 56 links are restricted. However, as more links 
are added, the expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier continues to decrease as more 
desirable routes become unavailable and additional shipments are prohibited from 
transport (due to lack of available paths). When the top 25 populated links are 
restricted, 5.3% of total carloads cannot be transported. When the 30 most populated 
links are restricted, 6.4% of total carloads become infeasible though maintaining the 
expected return to the Terrorist. 
 
 39 
In order to limit exposure to 8,000, the top 70 most populated links on the network 
must be restricted. This comes at significant expense to the Shipper/Carrier as 10.3% 
of total carloads are not able to be shipped. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier and the Terrorist from closing the 
most populated links 
 
5.3 Probability of an attack = 0.001% 
Table 4 and Figure 6 show the efficient frontier from the solutions found for p = 
0.001%. The four solutions (Points I, II, III, and IV) represent the Nash equilibria of 
four efficient sets of link restrictions. Point I represents the Nash equilibrium when no 
link restrictions are imposed on the network and the expected payoff to the Terrorist is 
allowed to be arbitrarily high. Points II through IV represent link restrictions that 
reflect the increasing interest in limiting the potential impacts of an attack. Figure 
7Figures 7 and 8 show the key links. 
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Table 4. Efficient frontier for the case study (p = 0.001%) 
 
 
Point Restrict-ions 
Number 
of Links 
Restricted  
Links 
Closed 
Car-
loads 
not 
shipped 
per year 
(% of 
total) 
P(z) 
(Expected 
payoff to 
Shipper/ 
Carrier) 
Expected 
Utility 
for 
Shipper 
when no 
Attack 
occurs 
Q(z) 
(Expected 
payoff to 
Terrorist) 
Strategy adopted 
by the Shipper 
Strategy adopted 
by the Terrorist 
Routing 
Scheme 
Chosen 
Probabil-
ity with 
which the 
routing 
scheme is 
chosen 
(%) 
Link 
Chosen 
Probabil-
ity with 
which the 
link is 
chosen 
(%) 
I None None None 0 (0%) -108.43 -108.22 0.21 a 68 S 5 
b 32 T 95 
II β ≤ 0.2 3 Q, R, S 840 (1.9%) -120.08 -119.88 0.20 c 100 U 100 
III β ≤ 0.1 7 
L, Q, 
R, S, 
U, Y, 
Z 
2400 
(5.4%) -135.20 -135.10 0.10 
d 63 K 59 
e 37 W 41 
IV β ≤ 0.08 8 
K, N, 
Q, R S, 
U, W, 
Y 
2880 
(6.4%) -140.90 -140.82 0.08 f 100 M 100 
 40 
 41 
 
Figure 6. Efficient Frontier for the case study (p = 0.001%) 
Figure 7. Key links in the Eastern US 
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Figure 8. Key links in Northern California 
 
At Point I, the likelihood of an attack is high enough to dissuade the Shipper/Carrier 
from having Shipment σ exclusively use its route with the highest utility in the case of 
no attack (shown in Figure 3) and to use Shipment σ’s second highest utility route in 
the case of no attack with some frequency. These two routes traverse the network’s 
most populous links, Links S and T. All other shipments use routes that offer the 
highest utility in the case of no attack since these routes do not use these links (S and 
T), including Shipment τ, as seen in Figure 4. As a result, the Shipper/Carrier chooses 
Routing Scheme a where all shipments use their utility maximizing route in the case 
of no attack, with a probability of 68% and Routing Scheme b where all shipments use 
their utility maximizing route in the case of no attack with the exception of Shipment 
σ, who is traveling from Oakland, CA to Houston, TX using his secondary route, with 
a probability of 32%.  
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Links S and T are attacked with a probability of 5% and 95% respectively. The 
severity of an attack is ameliorated by the fact that the Terrorist only knows with some 
probability when and where Shipment σ will be present, so some attempts will be 
unsuccessful. The attack rates on Links S and T reflect the Terrorist hedging their 
strategy to maximize their payoff. The expected payoff to the Terrorist is 0.21, which 
translates to a population exposure of 21,000 when the probability of an attack is 
0.001%. 
 
It is also worth noting that it is not necessarily a good strategy to simply close the 
links the Terrorist would target. Take Links S and T for example.  They are the most 
populated links on the West Coast and the links that the Terrorist targets at the Nash 
Equilibrium represented by Point I. If the Government (say a local government) 
chooses to close Links S and T, as shown in Figure 9, all shipments have feasible 
routes available to them. Shipment τ has access to its primary route in the case of no 
attack and Shipment σ no longer has access to his primary and secondary routes, but 
has access to his tertiary route. (See Figures 3 and 4). Furthermore, the Shipper/Carrier 
can have Shipments σ and τ can use any route that enters Oakland via Link P to Link 
Q. (See Figure 9). 
 
In this case, the Shipper/Carrier finds the maximum benefit from having each 
shipment use the highest utility route available to them with 100% probability and do 
not see any economic advantage from taking a route that uses Link Q. Shipment σ 
uses his tertiary route and Shipment τ uses his primary route. Link R has the largest 
population exposure at the time of truck crossing among all links in this routing 
scheme and will be attack with 100% probability. The expected payoff to the Terrorist 
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is 0.34, which is more than 50% greater than the Terrorist’s expected payoff when no 
link restrictions are imposed. The Shipper’s/Carrier’s expected payoff is -108.91. The 
Nash equilibrium represented by Point I, where no links are restricted, is a better 
strategy from the Government and Shipper’s/Carrier’s perspective since it has a lower 
expected payoff to the Terrorist (0.21) and a higher expected payoff to the 
Shipper/Carrier (-108.43). Keeping Links S and T open allows Shipments σ and τ to 
use a mixed strategy that uses high utility routes. In this case, this reduces the expected 
payoff to the Terrorist and increases the expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier. 
 
Figure 9. Nash Equilibrium when p = 0.001% and Links S and T are restricted (arrows 
indicate Shipment σ and τ’s selected route) 
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Point II is the result of establishing the prohibitions in the Oakland, CA area, as 
illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. Links Q, R, and S are closed. This point has an 
equivalent expected payoff to the Terrorist to closing the top 22 most populated links 
as shown in Section 5.2. Shipments σ and τ are prevented from traveling since all of 
their possible paths use a closed link. All remaining shipments solely use their highest 
utility route in the case of no attack, creating Routing Scheme c. Exclusive use of this 
routing scheme leads to a 10.7% drop in the expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier but 
only a slight decrease in the expected payoff to the Terrorist, as seen in Figure 6. 
Utility loss to the Shipper/Carrier stem from two causes: Shipments σ and τ not being 
able to travel and losses from an attack on Link U. By restricting these links, the 
Government creates a Nash equilibrium that reduces the Terrorist’s expected payoff 
by 4.7% to 0.20 and keeps the expected exposure level of 20,000. There exist no 
combinations of link closures that has the Shipper/Carrier optimally reroute Shipments 
σ and τ in a way that allows these shipments to travel and keeps exposure levels to 
below 20,000. To get an expected exposure level of 20,000 and still allow travel from 
Oakland, additional links in the network around Oakland are necessary. This would 
provide for additional options for the Shipper/Carrier which are less attractive to the 
Terrorist. 
 
Since the Shipper/Carrier always uses Routing Scheme c, the Terrorist always attacks 
the link (Link U) on that routing scheme with the largest value of exposure, as 
illustrated in Figure 10. 
. 
 
 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Nash Equilibrium for Point II, Routing Scheme c (p = 0.001% and 3 link 
restrictions) 
 
Figure 11.  Link restrictions Q, R, and S 
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Point III in Figure 6 represents a decline of about 53% in the payoff to the terrorist 
when seven links are prohibited from use.  Figure 12 and 13 give the two routing 
schemes associated with this Nash equilibrium. This set of seven link restrictions 
prohibits movements into and out of Philadelphia (U,Y and Z)  and Oakland (via links 
Q,R and S)  as well as access to one link near Knoxville, TN - Link L. Note that four 
of the restricted links are shown in Figures 12 and 13. The other three restricted links 
prohibit access to Oakland and are shown in Figure 11. 5.3% of total carloads are not 
shipped. The Terrorist attacks Link W with a frequency of 41% and Link K with a 
frequency of 59%. 
 
The expected payoff to the Terrorist represented by Point III is equivalent to the 
expected payoff to the Terrorist when the top 25 most populated links through the top 
56 most populated links are restricted in Section 5.2. The expected payoff to the 
Shipper/Carrier is slightly better in Point III compared to these restrictions from 
Section 5.2. For example, when the top 30 links are restricted, an additional 480 
carloads are not shipped compared to Point III. This is due to inefficient link 
restrictions that do nothing to reduce the exposure levels but do prevent transport of 
hazmats, and hence reduce the expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier. 
 
Closing Link L is unintuitive since it does not border a densely populated US city. 
Simply closing the links providing access to Philadelphia and Oakland when p = 
0.001% reduces the expected payoff to the Terrorist 0.19 – a nominal decrease from 
when only access to Oakland is restricted (Point II in Figure 11).  
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To understand why, we focus on Shipment ρ which is traveling from Baton Rouge, 
LA to New York City, NY. When Link L is opened, the Shipper/Carrier selects 
Shipment ρ’s primary route in the case of no attack for use, shown in Figure 14. This 
route traverses Link W, the most populated, unrestricted link on the network and is the 
link the Terrorist will attack exclusively. Despite large potential losses from an attack, 
the Shipper/Carrier receives no economic incentive from varying Shipment ρ’s 
strategy. The Terrorist receives an expected payoff of 0.19 from this strategy. 
Prohibiting Link L makes all of Shipment ρ’s 50 highest utility routes in the case of no 
attack infeasible with the exception of Routes 11 and 33. Figure 14 also shows these 2 
routes. When Link L is closed, the Shipper/Carrier selects Route 11 for Shipment ρ 
with 63% probability and Route 33 with 37% probability. All other shipments not 
barred from travel use their primary route in the case of no attack. This creates 
Routing Schemes d and e. Route 11 traverses Link W, though at a time of day when 
Link W is slightly less populated than when the primary route traverses Link W, 
further reducing the Terrorist’s expected payoff. The Terrorist finds benefit in varying 
his strategy as well. He attacks Link W with 41% probability and Link K with 59% 
probability. However, the best expected payoff the Terrorist can receive is 0.10, 
equivalent to an exposure of 10,000.  
 
So, by the Government closing Link L, the Shipper/Carrier is slightly worse off, only 
because Shipment ρ does not have access to its primary route. However, the 
Terrorist’s expected payoff decreases dramatically. There is no other combination of 
non-dominated link restrictions that provide a greater expected payoff to the 
Shipper/Carrier while maintaining the Terrorist’s expected payoff to this level, making 
Point III efficient. 
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Figure 12.  Nash equilibrium for Point III, Routing Scheme d (p = 0.001% and 7 link 
restrictions, 4 of which are shown) 
Figure 13.  Nash equilibrium for Point III, Routing Scheme e (p = 0.001% and 7 link 
restrictions, 4 of which are shown) 
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Figure 14. Shipment ρ’s strategies 
 
By using a mixed routing strategy, the Shipper/Carrier transfers some vulnerability 
onto other shipments. Figure 13Figures 12 and 13 show that there is always positive 
link volume on Link K, though we know Shipment ρ only traverses Link K when 
using Route 33. Therefore, there is at least one other shipment on the network which 
uses Link K and who will be present when Shipment ρ is not. This has two 
implications: there will always be a shipment present for an attack on Link K and this 
shipment may not be Shipment ρ. Therefore, other shipments become vulnerable to an 
attack when a mixed strategy is used. 
 
Point IV represents the Nash equilibrium of the most restrictive network, with eight 
link restrictions. Five of the eight links restricted by the Government are shown in 
Figure 15. The three other restricted links block access to Oakland and are also 
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restricted by Points II and III, as shown in Figure 11. The expected payoff to the 
Terrorist is controlled to 0.08 – a 61.9% reduction from expected payoff to the 
Terrorist offered by Point I and the optimal solution when the government aims to 
restrict expected exposure to 8,000. The increased restrictions make some routes 
infeasible. The Shipper/Carrier is prevented from making shipments to and from 
Oakland, Philadelphia, and New York City. 6.4% of total carloads are not shipped. 
 
The expected payoff to the Terrorist represented by Point IV is equivalent to the 
Terrorist’s expected payoff when the top 70 most populated links are restricted, as 
seen in Section 5.2. However, the expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier represented 
by Point IV, -140.9, is greater than the expected payoff to the Shipper/Carrier when 
the top 70 most populated links are restricted, -147.8. When the top 70 most populated 
links are restricted, 10.3% of total carloads are restricted from transport in contrast to 
6.4% based on the restrictions associated with Point IV.  
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Figure 15.  Nash Equilibrium for Point IV (p = 0.001% and 8 link restrictions, 5 of 
which are shown) 
 
5.4 Probability of an Attack = 0.01% 
Table 5 and Figure 16 show the efficient frontier from the solutions found for p = 
0.01%.  For a higher probability of an attack, the Shipper/Carrier chooses to be more 
conservative with their routing decisions and the Government does not need to apply 
as many restrictions. For example, to control the return to the terrorist below a 
threshold of 8,000, 8 link restrictions are needed with the probability of attack is 
0.001% in contrast to 6 when the probability of attack is 0.01%.
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Table 5. Efficient frontier for the case study (p = 0.01%) 
Point Restrict-ions 
Number of 
Links 
Restricted 
Links 
Closed
Car-
loads 
not 
shipped 
per year 
(% of 
total) 
P(z) 
(Expected 
payoff to 
Shipper/ 
Carrier) 
Expected 
Utility 
for 
Shipper 
when no 
Attack 
occurs 
Q(z) 
(Expected 
payoff to 
Terrorist) 
Strategy adopted 
by the Shipper at 
the Nash 
Equilibrium 
Strategy adopted 
by the Terrorist at 
the Nash 
Equilibrium 
Routing 
Scheme 
Chosen 
Probabil-
ity with 
which the 
routing 
scheme is 
chosen 
(%) 
Link 
Chosen 
Probabil-
ity with 
which the 
link is 
chosen 
(%) 
V None None None 0 (0%) -110.23 -108.26 1.97 
a 51 R 6 
b 29 S 3 
g 7 T 15 
h 13 U 76 
VI β ≤ 1.5 3 U, Y, Z 
1560 
(3.5%) -124.86 -123.46 1.41 
j 46 R 12 
k 33 S 15 
l 12 T 28 
m 9 W 45 
VII β ≤ 0.8 6 
Q, R, 
S, U, 
Y, Z 
2400 
(5.4%) -135.93 -135.11 0.80 
n 39 K 11 
q 15 V 77 
s 46 W 12 
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Figure 16. Efficient Frontier for the case study (p = 0.01%) 
 
Point V on the efficient frontier represents the solution obtained when there is no limit 
on the expected payoff to the Terrorist and thus there are no restrictions on the 
network. In this case, the probability of an attack is high enough to dissuade the 
Shipper/Carrier from having Shipments σ and τ exclusively use the routes that offer 
the highest utility in the case of no attack, because it is links on these routes that the 
Terrorist primarily targets. Shipments σ’s and τ’s strategies combine to create four 
unique routing schemes. Routing Scheme a is used with 51% probability and has all 
shipment using their primary route. Routing Scheme b is used with 29% and has all 
shipments using their primary route except for Shipment σ, which uses its secondary 
route. Routing Schemes a and b are identical to Routing Schemes a and b when p = 
0.001%. Routing Scheme g is used with 7% probability and is identical to Routing 
Scheme b except that Shipment σ uses its tertiary route. Routing Scheme h is used 
with 13% probability and Shipment τ uses his secondary route and all remaining 
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shipments use their primary route. Shipments σ’s and τ’s strategies can be seen in 
Figures 3 and 4. 
 
Just as the Shipper/Carrier finds benefit in a mixed strategy, so does the Terrorist. He 
attacks Links R, S, T, and U with probabilities 3%, 15%, 76%, and 6% respectively. 
(Link U is shown in Figure 17 and is utilized by shipments entering and leaving 
Philadelphia.) Despite Links S and T having high exposure levels, they are infrequent 
targets of an attack. This is due to the diversified strategy in the Oakland area 
providing ambiguity as to the location of Shipments σ and τ. Link U is targeted with a 
reasonably high possibility (76%). Shipments transporting hazmats to and from 
Philadelphia do not attain economic benefit by varying their strategy at this risk level. 
The Terrorist’s expected return when the probability of attack is 0.01% is 1.97, 
meaning the expected exposure is 19,700 – a 6.2% reduction from the Nash 
equilibrium strategy of Point I. As the probability of an attack increases, the 
Shipper/Carrier finds benefit in diversifying his strategy for Shipments σ and τ to 
offset his risk. This reduces the expected payoff to the Terrorist and shows that the 
Shipper’s/Carrier’s and the Government’s goals are aligning. 
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Figure 17.  Nash Equilibrium for Point V near Philadelphia (p = 0.01% and no 
restrictions) 
 
The Nash equilibrium represented by Point VI shows that restricting access to 
Philadelphia reduces the expected Terrorist’s payoff to 1.41 and limits expected 
exposure to below 15,000 – a 28.4% reduction from the expected exposure levels of 
Point V. Akin to Point V, the Shipper/Carrier is persuaded to use a mixed strategy for 
Shipments σ and τ that decreases the expected payoff to the Terrorist. Shipment ρ, 
who is traveling to New York City, also finds economic benefit from a mixed strategy. 
Should access to Philadelphia remain, the Shipper/Carrier sees no advantage to 
varying the strategy of shipments whose origination and destination are Philadelphia 
and reducing the payoff to the terrorist at this p. Therefore, from the Government’s 
perspective, it is best to first restrict access to Philadelphia, rather than Oakland (when 
p = 0.001%). Table 6 summarizes the paths selected by the Shipper/Carrier for 
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Shipments σ, τ, and ρ for Routing Scheme j-m. Figures 3, 4, and 14 show the paths the 
Shipper/Carrier selects for Shipments σ, τ, and ρ. 
 
Table 6. Routing schemes for the Nash equilibria represented by Point VI 
Routing 
Scheme 
Probability 
with which 
the routing 
scheme is 
chosen (%) 
Route of 
Shipment 
σ 
Route of 
Shipment 
τ 
Route of 
Shipment 
ρ 
Shipments 
Entering or 
Departing 
Philadelphia 
All other 
Shipments 
j 46 
Primary 
Route 
Secondary 
Route 
Primary 
Route 
Do Not 
Travel 
Primary 
Route 
K 33 
Tertiary 
Route 
Primary 
Route 
Primary 
Route 
Do Not 
Travel 
Primary 
Route 
l 12 
Secondary 
Route 
Tertiary 
Route 
Primary 
Route 
Do Not 
Travel 
Primary 
Route 
m 9 
Secondary 
Route 
Tertiary 
Route 
33rd 
Route 
Do Not 
Travel 
Primary 
Route 
 
Links R, S, and T are attacked with likelihood 15%, 28%, and 12% respectively. Link 
W provides access to New York City and is attacked with likelihood 45%, as shown in 
Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.  Nash Equilibrium for Point VI, Routing Scheme j (p = 0.01% and 3 link 
restrictions) 
 
Point VII represents the Nash equilibria where the Government wishes to limit the 
expected exposure to 8,000. This exposure level is equivalent to the expected exposure 
of Points IV. Notice that in order to get the same expected exposure with a lower 
probability of an attack to that with a higher probability, the number of link 
restrictions needs to be greater. For example, Points IV and VII have the same 
expected exposure, but Point IV requires eight link restrictions while Point VII 
requires six. Some routes that offer high utility are no longer attractive to the 
Shipper/Carrier when the probability of attack is higher since they contain links with 
higher population exposure which leads to worse expected payoffs to the 
Shipper/Carriers when an attack occurs. Thus the Shipper/Carrier prefers to control the 
consequences of a successful attack, and therefore the Terrorist’s expected payoff, by 
either avoiding such routes or utilizing a mixed strategy approach. At this point, the 
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Shipper’s/Carrier’s and the Government’s goals begin to align, and the Government 
needs to enact fewer prohibitions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper develops a model of the interactions among a shipper/carrier of a hazardous 
material, a terrorist and the government using a full origin-destination table to 
understand: (1) how governments might set link prohibitions to cope with the threat of 
attack on a shipment of hazardous materials; (2) how the shipper/carrier might make 
decisions of which routes to use with what frequencies in response to these 
prohibitions and the underlying threat of terrorism and (3) what links terrorists might 
then target with what frequencies. In order to achieve this we construct a non-linear 
integer optimization which is an extension of a two-person, non-zero sum game given 
in Mangasarian and Stone (1964). In order to effectively solve the resultant 
optimization for realistic instances, a heuristic was developed to identify the 
shipper’s/carrier’s pareto-efficient routing schemes and from that, a heuristic was 
created to identify effective prohibitions. 
 
The model was then applied to a realistic case study focused on the shipment of a 
hazardous material on the US rail network, using a full origin-destination table. These 
analyses illustrated that as the probability of an attack rises, the shipper/carrier should 
select more and more conservative routes which causes a decline in the expected 
payoff to the shipper/carrier but also controls the damages caused by an attack. This 
behavior is of particular importance because historically when considering routing 
decisions for hazardous material shipments, the emphasis has been on the 
identification of the single “best” route to use repetitively.  This game shows the 
weakness in that strategy and that it is dominated when the probability of an attack is 
significant. These analyses also show that as the probability of an attack rise the goals 
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of the government and the shipper/carrier align. This results in the shipper/carrier 
making decisions that control the consequences of an attack. Therefore, the 
government does not need to enact quite as many prohibitions to control the 
consequences of an attack. The shipper/carrier now has sufficient incentives to avoid 
links that are particularly attractive targets for the terrorist. Third, this analysis 
illustrates the weaknesses of identifying prohibitions strictly based on simple metrics 
like population. In the case study, when link restrictions are placed on only two of the 
three links out Oakland (which have the highest exposure), there is a doubling of the 
return to the terrorist (from about 20,000 to 42,000). Also, when links are restricted 
based on exposure only, the return to the terrorist may actually increase and 
unnecessary negative impacts to the shipper/carrier may be imposed. Finally, this type 
of analysis can help identify non-intuitive locations for prohibitions. When the 
probability of attack is 0.001% when the links around Philadelphia and Oakland are 
restricted but not the link near Knoxville, the return to the terrorist is about 0.19 but 
when this additional link is restricted the return drops to about 0.1 (with a modest 
impact on the shippers; from -135.06 to -135.20).   
 
This paper contributes to the literature by developing a non-cooperative non-zero sum 
game which represents the interactions between a shipper/carrier, terrorist and the 
government for the movement of hazardous materials for a single shipper/carrier for 
multiple origin-destination pairs. It creates reasonable rules to predict what the 
shipper/carrier and terrorist are likely to do in response to government prohibitions 
and their interactions with each other. This allows the identification of a single Nash 
equilibrium point for the interactions between a shipper/carrier and a terrorist for a 
given value of p and a maximum allowable expected payoff to the terrorist which can 
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then be used in for decision-making by all three parties. Finally a solution procedure 
that is effective for realistic problems is also developed. 
 
There are three key areas for additional research.  First, extend the formulation and 
solution procedure to address multiple shippers, each with several origins and 
destinations. Second extend the game to simultaneously consider a coordinated 
terrorist attack. These extensions would substantially enrich the decision-making 
included in the game by all players. Finally, there are other application areas for the 
tools developed in this analysis.  For example, the same core question can be applied 
to truck weight enforcement. Given unlimited resources, governments would operate 
truck weigh stations continuously in order to catch all of the overweight vehicles on 
the US highway system. The methodology described in this paper could be used to 
optimally determine which weigh stations should be opened at what time to catch as 
many overweight trucks as possible. 
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APPENDIX 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
To gain a better understanding of the model, we apply it to the example network 
illustrated in Figure 19. Three shippers are interested in making repetitive shipments 
between Node 1 and Node 2 (OD 1-2), Node 2 and Node 3 (OD 2-3), and Node 2 and 
Node 4 (OD 2-4), respectively. Figure 1 also shows the link length, and the off-link 
population exposure. The probability of attack is assumed to be 1%. 
 
Figure 19. 4-Node, 5-Link Illustrative Network 
Three routing alternatives exist for each OD pair and are given in Table 1. In this 
example, the shipper of each OD pair wishes to minimize cost which is assumed 
proportional to distance. Since an increase in distance signifies that the shipper is 
worse off, the negative of the normalized distance, with the minimum distance scaled 
to -100, is taken as the utility, Ukq, of shipper of OD Pair k’s route q.  Note that the 
shipper of OD Pair k achieves this utility only in case of no attack.  
*Not to scale 
Link 1-3, 40 mi, 
15,000 exposure 
Link 1-2, 23.5 mi, 
30,000 exposure 
Link 2-4, 56 mi, 
33,000 exposure 
Link 3-4, 36.5 mi, 
31,000 exposure 
Link 2-3,  
21.5 mi, 22,000 
exposure 
1
2
3
4 
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Table 7. Routing alternatives with utilities for the shippers of OD Pairs 1-2, 2-3, and 
2-4 
  OD Pair 1-2 OD Pair 2-3 OD Pair 2-4 
 Route 
Utility 
of 
Route Route 
Utility 
of 
Route Route 
Utility 
of 
Route 
OD Pair k's Primary 
Route 1-2 -109.3 2-3 -100.0 2-4 -260.5 
OD Pair k's Secondary 
Route 1-3-2 -286.0 2-1-3 -295.3 2-3-4 -269.8 
OD Pair k's Tertiary 
Route 1-4-3-2 -616.3 2-4-3 -430.2 2-1-3-4 -465.1 
Before we develop potential routing schemes, we examine (1) the expected exposure 
resulting from an attack on each link and (2) the expected utility of each route when a 
specific link is attacked. The expected exposure is developed first as this information 
is necessary for developing (2). The expected utility and expected exposure are 
necessary components for creating the shippers’ routing schemes and computing the 
shippers’ and terrorist’s expected payoff matrices, A and B. 
Table 2 shows the expected exposure from an attack on the shipper of OD Pair k on 
Link 1-2 for each of the three available routes. As Table 8 and Figure 19 show, the 
terrorist’s expected payoff from attacking the shipper of OD Pair 1-2 on Link 1-2 
when the shipper uses his primary route is 0.01*30,000 = 300. However, if this 
shipper decides to use his secondary route, the terrorist would expect to receive 
nothing if he attacks Link 1-2 since this shipper does not traverse Link 1-2. Using the 
information from Tables 7 and 8 and the probability of an attack, the shipper of OD 
Pair k’s expected utility in the case of an attack on Link 1-2 for each of its three 
available routes is evaluated. 
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Table 8. Terrorist's expected payoff from attacking the shipper OD Pair k on Link 1-2 
 OD Pair 1-2 OD Pair 2-3 OD Pair 2-4 
 
OD Pair k's Primary Route 300 0 0 
OD Pair k's Secondary 
Route 0 300 0 
OD Pair k's Tertiary Route 0 0 300 
 
Table 9. Shipper of OD Pair k's expected utility for each available route in the case of 
Link 1-2 being attacked 
  
O-D Pair 1-2 O-D Pair 2-3 O-D Pair 2-4 
OD Pair k's Primary Route -408.2 -100.0 -260.5 
OD Pair k's Secondary Route -286.0 -592.4 -269.8 
OD Pair k's Tertiary Route -616.3 -430.2 -760.5 
Table 9 shows the shipper of OD Pair k’s expected utility in the case of an attack on 
Link 1-2 for all three available routes. If the shipper of OD Pair k does not use Link 1-
2 when traveling on a specified route, the expected utility is simply the utility of that 
route, given in Table 7. Otherwise, the expected utility is the expected utility of route 
q in case of no attack (from Table 7) minus the expected value of damage caused by a 
successful attack (from Table 8).  For example, since the shippers of OD Pair 1-2’s 
primary route uses Link 1-2, its expected payoff on Link 1-2 is 99% * -109.3 - 1% * 
30,000 = -408.2.  However, since the shipper of OD Pair 1-2 does not use Link 1-2 
when traveling his secondary route, the expected payoff on Link 1-2 is -286.0, which 
is the utility of his secondary route. 
The goal of the first step for creating routing schemes is to maximize the shippers’ 
total path utility in the case of an attack on a specific link. We illustrate this assuming 
an attack on Link 1-2 and create a routing scheme that is non-dominated in case of an 
attack on this link. The shippers of OD Pairs 2-3 and 2-4 do not traverse Link 1-2 
 66 
when traveling their primary route, so they contribute their primary, highest utility 
routes to the routing scheme. On the other hand, the expected utility of the shipper of 
OD Pair 1-2’s primary route is less than the expected utility of his secondary route, as 
seen in Table 9. This is because his primary route traverses Link 1-2, where the risk 
level is high. Therefore, the shipper of OD pair 1-2 contributes his secondary route to 
this routing scheme. We add Routing Scheme Γ, where the shippers of OD Pairs 2-3 
and 2-4 use their primary routes and the shipper of OD Pair 1-2 uses his secondary 
route, to the list of routing schemes. Routing Scheme Γ, like all routing schemes 
developed in Step 1, is non-dominated. The same logic is applied to the 4 remaining 
links to get 5 non-dominated routing schemes. From these non-dominated routing 
schemes, the expected payoff matrix for the terrorist can be calculated and the non-
dominated links, 1-2, 1-3, 2-3, 2-4, and 3-4 are determined. 
In Step 1, we used a link-based approach to maximize the shippers’ combined path 
utility from an attack on a particular link. In Step 2, we focus on the shippers 
individually and choose for each shipper which of his available routes maximizes his 
path utility in the case of an attack. Since the terrorist is a destruction maximizer, he 
targets the non-dominated link on a shipper’s selected path that possesses the greatest 
vulnerability. If the path does not contain a non-dominated link, the terrorist will not 
consider attacking any links along this path and the expected route utility is simply the 
utility given from completing the route. This is illustrated using OD Pair 2-4.   
Columns 2 through 6 of Table 10 show the expected route utility for the shipper of OD 
Pair 2-4 in the case of an attack on Non-Dominated Links 1-2, 1-3, 2-3, 2-4, or 3-4. 
Knowing that the terrorist will attack the link on the path with the greatest expected 
exposure (Column 7), the expected route utility in the case of an attack on the link 
with the greatest exposure is calculated and shown in Column 8. For example, when 
 67 
the shipper of OD pair 2-4 travels his primary route, the terrorist will attack Link 2-4 
since this link has the greatest exposure (and the only link that the primary path uses). 
The shipper expects to receive 99%*-260.5 -1%*33,000 = -587.9 in this case. 
Likewise, when he travels his secondary route, the terrorist has the option of attacking 
Links 2-3 and 3-4. Link 3-4 has greater exposure levels (31,000 versus 22,000), and 
will be targeted. The shipper expects to receive 99%*-269.8 -1%*31,000 = -577.1 in 
this case. 
Notice that this shipper’s secondary route has a greater expected utility in the case of 
an attack than its primary route (as seen in Column 8), making the secondary route 
advantageous for the shipper of OD pair 2-4. Routing Scheme Λ is created where the 
shipper of OD Pair 2-4 take his secondary route and all other shippers use their 
primary route. This logic of maximizing the expected utility in the case of an attack on 
link with the greatest exposure is repeated for all OD pairs, creating up to an 
additional 3 routing schemes. There is no guarantee that these additional routing 
schemes will be non-dominated. 
Table 10. Shipper of OD Pair 2-4 expected payoff in the case of an attack 
  Shipper of OD Pair 2-4’s expected utility in the case 
of an attack on Non-Dominated Links  
Link 
Targeted 
Shipper of 
OD Pair 
2-4’s 
expected 
utility in 
the case of 
an attack 
  
  
Link 
1-2 
Link 
1-3 
Link 
2-3 
Link  
2-4 
Link 
3-4 
Primary 
Route -260.5 -260.5 -260.5 -587.9 -260.5 Link 2-4 -587.9 
Secondary 
Route -269.8 -269.8 -487.1 -269.8 -577.1 Link 3-4 -577.1 
Tertiary 
Route -760.5 -610.5 -465.1 -465.1 -770.5 Link 3-4 -770.5 
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In Step 2, we select the path for each shipper that minimizes the route utility loss in 
the case of an attack, assuming the terrorist will target the most vulnerable non-
dominated link on a given path. However, all players may choose to and receive 
benefit from varying their strategy. Therefore, in Step 3, we consider the ability of the 
terrorist to use mixed strategies and consider what the shippers might do in response. 
Specifically, in Step 3 we determine for each of the routing schemes enumerated thus 
far if there is a different route that the shipper of an OD pair can take that increases the 
expected utility in case of an attack on any of the non-dominated links. This process is 
iterative – each new routing scheme that is generated is then reexamined for an attack 
on any of the non-dominated links. This process stops once no new routing schemes 
are generated. 
Take Routing Scheme Λ developed in Step 2 as an example - all shippers take their 
primary route, except the shipper of OD Pair 2-4, who takes his secondary route. 
When we look at the impact on the shipper of OD Pair 1-2 from this routing scheme 
and a possible attack on Link 1-2, we see that he would fare better using his secondary 
route – see Column 2 of Table 11. Therefore, Routing Scheme Ξ is added to the list of 
feasible routing schemes and is identical to Routing Scheme Λ except that the shipper 
of OD Pair 1-2 use his secondary route. This process is continued by examining the 
impact on expected utility in the case of an attack on Non-Dominated Links 1-2, 1-3, 
2-3, 2-4, or 3-4 for all remaining routing schemes and for all OD pairs. After Iteration 
1, 4 new routing schemes are added and this process is repeated until no additional 
routing schemes are found.  In this example, a total of 8 unique routing schemes are 
discovered in Steps 1 through 3. 
 69 
Table 11. Shipper of OD Pair 1-2 expected utility in the case of an attack on non-
dominated links 
  Link 1-2 Link 1-3 Link 2-3 Link 2-4 Link 3-4 
Primary Route -408.2 -109.3 -109.3 -109.3 -109.3 
Secondary Route -286.0 -433.2 -503.2 -286.0 -286.0 
Tertiary Route -616.3 -760.1 -616.3 -940.1 -920.1 
The shippers’ and terrorist’s expected payoff matrices are then computed.  Any 
dominated routing schemes or link as determined from the shippers’ and terrorist’s 
payoff matrices are removed from both players payoff matrix. This results in 5 non-
dominated links, Links 1-2, 1-3, 2-3, 2-4, and 3-4 and 5 non-dominated routing 
schemes shown in Column 3 of Tables 12 and 13. The first entry in Column 3 of these 
tables, (2,1,1), says that the shipper of OD Pair 1-2 uses his secondary route and 
shippers of OD Pairs 2-3 and 2-4, respectively, use their primary route. Three of the 5 
non-dominated routing schemes, Γ Δ, and Θ, are derived in Step 1 and represent the 
shippers’ best expected payoff in the case of an attack on each of the 5 non-dominated 
links. Steps 2 and 3 produce Routing Schemes Λ and Ξ, respectively.  The payoff 
matrices, shown in Tables 12 and 13 are then used to solve equations (14) through 
(25). 
Table 12. Shippers’ Expected Payoff Matrix 
 
    
Routing 
Scheme 
Components Link 1-2 Link 1-3 Link 2-3 Link 2-4 Link 3-4 
R
ou
tin
g 
Sc
he
m
e 
Γ (2,1,1) -646.5 -793.7 -862.7 -973.9 -646.5 
Δ (1,1,1) -768.7 -469.8 -688.8 -797.2 -469.7 
Θ (1,2,1) -961.1 -812.2 -665.1 -992.5 -665.1 
Λ (1,1,2) -778.0 -479.1 -695.4 -479.1 -786.4 
Ξ (2,1,2) -655.8 -803.0 -869.3 -655.8 -963.1 
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Table 13. Terrorist’s Expected Payoff Matrix 
    
Routing 
Scheme 
Components Link 1-2 Link 1-3 Link 2-3 Link 2-4 Link 3-4 
R
ou
tin
g 
Sc
he
m
e 
Γ (2,1,1) 0 150 220 330 0 
Δ (1,1,1) 300 0 220 330 0 
Θ (1,2,1) 300 150 0 330 0 
Λ (1,1,2) 300 0 220 0 310 
Ξ (2,1,2) 0 150 220 0 310 
The shippers’ expected payoff for Routing Scheme Γ in the case of an attack on Link 
2-4 is -973.9 and is calculated as follows. Routing Scheme Γ uses the following links: 
Link 1-3, 2-3, and 2-4. The link with the greatest exposure is Link 2-4, with an off-
link population of 33,000. Therefore the expected system loss is 1% * 33,000 = 330. 
Only the shipper of OD pair 2-4 uses this link and is concerned with being targeted. 
Hence, the shippers of OD pairs 1-2 and 2-3 each contribute the utility of their 
selected routes, -286.0 and -100.0 respectively, and the shipper of OD pair 2-4 
contributes the expected utility of a successful trip, 99% * -260.5 = -257.9 to the 
expected payoff calculation. The aggregation of the utilities, -257.0 + -286.0 + -100 − 
330 = -973.9, creates the expected payoff to the shippers using Routing Scheme Γ in 
the case of an attack on Link 2-4. 
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